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RECLAIMING OUR ESSENTIAL FREEDOM TO
DETERMINE WHO MAY BE ADMITTED TO
STUDY LAW
JEFFREY EVANS STAKE*
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a
university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.'
The freedom to determine who may be admitted to the community of
students is essential to an institution of higher learning. How has this
freedom been used at law schools in the United States? Over time, it has
been used to prefer students who are honest over those who are ethically
challenged. It has been used to admit students who obey legal rules over
those who break them. It has been used to prefer residents of a state. It has
been used to prefer veterans who have served our nation in foreign wars. It
has been used to admit outspoken conservative writers on student
newspapers. It has been used to prefer students who overcame great
obstacles to get to college and through. It has been used to admit students
who wrote gripping or humorous personal statements. It has been used to
admit students belonging to racial minorities. It has been used to admit
relatives of major donors. 2 It has been used to admit students who fit well
* Robert A. Lucas Chair of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana. I
thank Prof. Leonard Baynes, St. John's University School of Law, and the Society of American Law
Teachers for inviting me to participate in the Opening Doors symposium. I also thank Janet Stake,
Carole Silver, Dan Conkle, Kevin Brown, and Robert Stake for helpful comments, and Leonard Fromm
for data.
I Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. N.H., 354
U.S. 234, 263 (1957)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
2 It will be sadly ironic if the 14th Amendment is read to say that admissions at state-supported
schools may be used to establish and perpetuate a mostly white American legal aristocracy and at the
same time may not be used to promote effective representation of slave descendants in positions of
legal power.
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called
history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination of the language
of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found
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into important substantive programs. It has been used to prefer students
who get A's over students who get C's. It has been used to prefer students
who get high scores on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) over those
who had a bad day on the wrong day. It has been used to prefer students
who have taken challenging courses over those who have signed up for the
"easy A." It has been used to prefer students with the talent and persistence
to obtain a PhD over those fresh out of college. It has been used to admit
students who look like they will make good lawyers and responsible
citizens. It has been used to construct a class drawn from a diversity of
backgrounds and reflecting a broad spectrum of perspectives.
But this freedom has been usurped. This essential freedom of American
law schools to choose their students has been eviscerated by the annual
ranking published by U.S. News and World Report ("USN&WR "), which
relies heavily on data collected by the American Bar Association ("ABA").
It is unlikely that USN&WR and the ABA originally intended to gut our
freedom, 3 but gut it they have. The ABA demands our data and USN& WR
cranks them through a formula that commands us, on penalty of low rank,
in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been
even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only the
fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color and his slavery.
But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race,
and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose of them, which
we have already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to this clause. The existence of
laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with
gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this
clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.
• . . We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that
emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 7!-72, 81 (1872). The Court subsequently proved itself wrong,
expanding the scope of the Amendments beyond their core historical purpose. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at
405 (Blackmun, J., Concurring) ("This enlargement [beyond its original 1868 concept] does not mean
for me, however, that the 14a' Amendment has broken away from its moorings and its original intended
purposes.").
3 In personal conversations with me, Robert Morse, the USN&WR editor in charge of the ranking,
has expressed eagerness to use factors that put less pressure on schools to exclude diversity students,
and his actions have backed up his words. After I explained why the 25"b percentiles constrain schools
more than the medians, discussed below, he used the medians as long as possible and then switched
back to the medians as soon as that became practical (when the ABA collected the data again). The
evidence regarding the intent of the ABA is more ambiguous. Despite my plea many years ago to a
member of the questionnaire committee, that ABA committee decided to eliminate the medians from
the surveys, thus undermining their use by USN&WR. The ABA did not resume collecting the medians
until law school deans recognized the damage being done by USN&WR's use of the 25b percentiles and
asked the ABA to resume collecting medians.
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to focus admissions solely on the LSAT and undergraduate grade point
average ("UGPA") and to turn a blind eye to all other indicators of merit.
The ABA and USN&WR have unwittingly pressed schools to exclude
minority students, and schools have found it hard to resist.4
USN&WR gives 12.5% of the total score to the median LSAT and 10%
of the total score to the median UGPA of first-year students matriculating
at each law school. Since the median is the number in the middle of a group
of numbers, for a school to achieve a median LSAT of 155, more than half
of the class must have recorded an LSAT of 155 or above. To maximize the
median, a school would set a target median as high as might be achieved
and admit all eligible applicants having a number above the target.5
As a practical matter, the median LSAT taken alone does little to
discourage schools from admitting students they want to admit. Most
schools do not want to exclude large numbers of students with LSAT's
above the school's median and, because the median is the middle number,
it does not matter whether the numbers in the lower half of the distribution
are close to the median or a long way below it. Maximizing the median
LSAT thus leaves half of the class minus one for admission according to
other criteria deemed important to the school. In addition, because there are
many students at most LSAT levels, a school can deny a substantial
number of students above the target LSAT and still hit the target. For
example, a school aiming for a 155 LSAT will likely have many applicants
with a 155 or above. It can deny admission to a fair number of students
with LSAT's from 155 to 180 and still hit the 155 target, even if it would
have been impossible for the school to hit a 156. Because the LSAT is a
good predictor of law school performance and the median is determined by
only half of the class, the ABA-USN&WR command to maximize the
median LSAT infringes only a bit on the freedom to choose students.
The restriction on freedom in building a class goes from minimal to
severe, however, when the rankings add the goal of maximizing the median
4 The annual USN&WR ranking creates many other problems, none of which are addressed in this
short article. For a broader discussion of defects in rankings and incentives created by them, see, e.g.,
Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and Resource
Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L. J. 229 (2006) (merely one article in an issue publishing
a symposium on rankings); Malcolm Gladwell, What College Rankings Really Tell Us, THE NEW
YoRKER Feb. 14, 2011, at 68.
5 As a matter of admissions tactics, setting the target LSAT is somewhat easier than setting the
target UGPA because UGPA's are divided more finely. For example, a school might know that it is
possible to achieve a 155 LSAT median, but not a 156, and can set the bar at 155. The same school
might know that it can achieve a 3.45 UGPA median but not be sure whether it can achieve a 3.47. If
the bar is set at 3.47 and applicants with a 3.45 or 3.46 are denied, the school might fail to make the
3.47 goal and drop to 3.44. The same mistake can be made on the LSAT, but it is less likely because the
wider steps make it easier to predict what is possible and what is not.
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UGPA to the goal of maximizing the median LSAT. First, maximizing the
UGPA median is a problem on its own because many schools would like to
deny and do deny admission to substantial numbers of students with high
grades. Some college courses are easy and high grades in them do not
indicate high potential for learning law. Some college courses are hard and
low grades in them do not indicate low potential for learning law. For these
reasons and others, the UGPA does not work as well as the high LSAT for
predicting first-year law school performance (as measured by the first-year
grade point average ("FYA")). The Law School Admission Council
("LSAC") reports that the 2010 mean and median correlation between FYA
and the UGPA is .28, compared to .36 for the LSAT.6 Furthermore, the
predictive value of the UGPA might be worse than is indicated by the
correlation coefficient of .28. Schools look through the UGPA to the
underlying course grades, discounting grades that are not predictive of
success in law school. They deny admission to students with high UGPA's
when those high grades were achieved in easy courses. They also admit
students with low UGPA's when the low grades were acquired in hard
courses. If the former group is larger than the latter, if schools eliminate
more students with a high UGPA and low FYA than they admit with a low
UGPA and high FYA, the attention to course grades increases the
correlation between UGPA and FYA, making the UGPA appear more
predictive than it is. If, in their attempts to raise or keep their ranks in
USN&WR, schools become less discriminating in their admission of high
UGPA applicants, the correlation between FYI and UGPA will diminish. In
short, one reason that the UGPA limits admissions freedom more than the
LSAT does is that the UGPA is less predictive of performance and thus is
less aligned with what a school wants to do.
The median UGPA presents problems alone, and becomes a debilitating
constraint when added on top of the median LSAT. Because the LSAT and
UGPA are far from perfectly correlated, 7 the available students who would
bring a higher-than-median LSAT to a school are not all the same as those
who would bring a higher-than-median UGPA. Because the two groups do
not overlap enough, admissions offices could devote all of the seats in their
entering classes to maximizing those two numbers. As far as I know, that
6 Lisa Anthony Stilwell, Susan P. Dalessandro & Lynda M. Reese, Predictive Validity of the LSAT
A National Summary of the 2009 and 2010 LSA T Correlation Studies, LSAC T.2 (Oct. 2011), available
at http://www.Isac.org/docs/default-source/research-%281sac-resources%29/tr- 11-02.pdf. The
difference is greater (.44 versus .58) if one looks at Table 3, which presents unselected results. Not all
schools participated in the correlation study.
7 Stilwell, Dalessandro & Reese, supra note 6.
RECLAIMING OUR ESSENTIAL FREEDOM
hasn't happened yet at any law school, but the ABA and USN&WR have
done nothing to reduce the pressure to admit the entire class according to
those two criteria. The forces of resistance favoring broader societal and
professional considerations have not been entirely wiped out by the march
of the LSAT and UGPA, but they have lost ground.
Take, for one socially important example, three dimensions of student
diversity: enrollment of African Americans, Mexican Americans, and
Puerto Rican Americans. Between the school years 1999-2000 and 2009-
2010, total JD enrollment climbed by 16% from 125,184 to 145,239.8
During that same period, the percentage of the total enrollment shrank for
each of those three groups, from 7.4% (9,272) to 7.0% (10,173) for African
Americans, from 2% (2,483) to 1.8% (2,592) for Mexican Americans, and
from .5% (646) to .4% (626) for Puerto Rican Americans. 9 We can expect
continued diminution in diversity, many forms of diversity, not just racial
and ethnic, as time passes and the constraints of LSAT and UGPA medians
continue their relentless squeeze on some groups of applicants. 10
Moreover, the law schools' attempts to maximize LSAT and UGPA
medians are not limited to selecting students who have been badged with
high numbers. The ABA collects medians only for incoming first-year
students and not for all incoming students, so only the UGPA's and
LSAT's of first-year students matter for the ranking. Because reducing the
size of the first-year class reduces the number of students needed to achieve
high medians, schools have used that tactic to improve their rank. This
reduces revenue, but some schools have made up the lost revenue by
admitting more JD transfer students and International Graduate Law School
("IGLS") students.
8 LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL & AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 871 (2012).
9 Id. at 869-70. By contrast, two other minority groups showed percentage gains over that period,
from 6.3% (7,883) to 7.8% (11,327) for Asian or Pacific Islanders and from .8% (978) to .9% (1,273)
for American Indian or Alaska Natives. Id. at 868. The way that racial and ethnic minorities are counted
has changed under new regulations promulgated by the Department of Education. Under these
regulations, one question identifies Hispanic/Latino ethnicity. A separate question asks respondents to
mark one or more of five racial groups, and those who mark more than one race will be counted in a
new, "Two or More Races" category. For a discussion of the history and effect of the new regulations,
see Kevin Brown, Should Black Immigrants Be Favored Over Black Hispanics and Black Multiracials
in the Admissions Processes of Selective Higher Education Programs?, 54 HOw. L.J. 255, 256-57
(2011).
10 Bright students who did not recognize the importance of grades during their freshman year in
college (or even the importance of the grades in college courses they took while in high school!) are not
usually singled out for sympathy in critiques of current law school admissions, but they surely have
fewer law school options today than were open to them a few decades ago. Likewise, students who
develop their talents in graduate school, perhaps by obtaining a PhD, do nothing to enhance their
attractiveness on the criteria important to the ABA and USN&WR.
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Transfer programs are bad for student learning. When I taught classes in
Land-Use Controls and Wills and Trusts to American law school students
studying in London, I ' I took class time away from the planned materials in
both of those courses to explain some basic Property rules to students who
had not been exposed to a Property course like those at Maurer. 12 This
wasted the time of the students who took their first year at Maurer. I could
have taken the other approach, plowing ahead despite some students' lack
of a proper foundation, but I thought that would not be fair to those
students. Similarly, when there are a substantial number of transfer students
in a class, the teacher cannot make assumptions about what all of the
students have studied in previous course work. Thus the presence of a large
group of transfer students diminishes the efficiency of legal instruction for
teachers who try to teach something more than "how to think like a
lawyer."
Transfer programs also harm the social and educational fabric of the
school the students transferred from. Because these negative externalities
are not considered by the schools making the decision to admit them, it is
possible that the external costs outweigh the internal benefits to the
recipient schools, if indeed there really are any educational benefits.
To top it off, transfer programs may reduce the happiness of the transfer
students and the effectiveness of their educational experience. Data from
the Law School Survey of Student Engagement ("LSSSE") indicate that
transfer students are less engaged in the community of learning at their new
school than the students who started there. According to the 2005 report,
Transfer students were less likely to:
o Perceive their relationships with other students to be as positive
as students who did not transfer.
o Work with other students outside of class to complete an
assignment.
o Have serious conversations with students who are different from
themselves.
o Discuss ideas from reading or assignments with others outside of
class.
o Work on a paper or project that required integrating ideas.
o Participate in cocurricular activities.
11 London Law Consortium, Spring 2008.
12 I am not suggesting that the Property course at Maurer is better than the Property courses at the
other schools represented in the program. I am only making a point about curriculum coordination.
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These findings underscore that many of the strongest student
relationships are formed during the first year of law school before
transfer students join the campus community. 13
The report had not changed much as of five years later. It said,
Transfer students were less likely than other students to participate in
law journal, moot court, and law school organizations.... In the 2L
year, transfer students also were less likely to participate in pro bono
activities and to work in law-related settings, suggesting that transfer
students may lose some opportunity for beneficial experiential
education. In addition, transfer students were less likely to work with
classmates outside of class to prepare assignments ... or have serious
conversations with students who differ from themselves. These data
suggest that some opportunities for connection and integration are
most salient during the first year of law school, and that transfer
students might suffer the loss of such opportunities. For certain
activities, the disadvantage related to transferring disappears in the 3L
year, perhaps as students become integrated into their new schools. 14
In addition to reducing student learning, transfer programs could be
reducing minority representation in law schools. At Maurer, 94 students
transferred out between 2000 and 2010, but only three of those transfers
were African American students and only one was a Hispanic student. 15 It
is not clear why minorities are under-represented in the population of
students transferring out of Maurer. Perhaps it is all a matter of self-
selection, and they are happy here. Or, minority students might be poorer
and more dependent on their existing scholarships than non-minority
students, making it more difficult for them to pay full freight at their new
school. Whatever the cause, the schools that took transfer students from
Maurer could have instead taken 94 more students into their first-year
classes, and those matriculants would as a matter of probabilities have
included a greater number of minority students.
In all, the transfer game appears to add up to a negative sum. If most of
the transfers were replaced by first-year students, those students would be
better integrated into the law school social network, their teachers in the
upper level curriculum would be better able to predict what foundation is
13 ALLISON GREY ANDERSON, THE LAW SCHOOL YEARS: PROBING QUESTIONS, ACTIONABLE
DATA, Law School Survey of Student Engagement, 2005 Annual Survey Results, at 13-14 (2005),
available at http://lssse.iub.edu/2005_Annual Report/pdf/LSSSE 2005 AnnualReport.pdf.
14 LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS, Navigating
Law School Years: Paths in Legal Education, at 12 (2011), available at
http://lssse.iub.edu/pdf/2011/201 ILSSSEAnnual_SurveyResults.pdf.
15 This information was supplied by former Maurer Associate Dean for Students, Leonard Fromm.
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available for constructing course discussions, and the class might include a
larger number of African American and Mexican American students. If
schools have more freedom of admissions, the decision on how many
transfer students to accept can be made more on the basis of the merits of
those students and their addition to the intellectual life of the school along
with their potential service to society and less on the basis of the need to
make up revenue foregone in an attempt to maximize the LSAT and UGPA
medians. An additional step that would reduce distortional incentives to
expand transfer programs is to require schools to report median scores for
all students entering the JD program each year, whatever class they are
entering. If the ABA views student numbers as a measure of school quality
and accreditability, those numbers should be gathered for all students, not
just those who entered as first-year students.
IGLS programs are not as harmful to curriculum coordination as transfer
programs, but classroom instruction may suffer somewhat because
language difficulties discourage IGLS students from contributing to
classroom discussions. Of course, IGLS students add to overall diversity
because the IGLS students are foreign students. They do not, however,
augment the representation of American minorities in American law
schools. As IGLS programs expand, the proportion of American minorities
will contract.
A couple of other factors in the USN& WR formula, bar passage ratio and
employment ratio, could have some impact on minority representation in
law schools and are worth a moment to consider. It will help a school on
bar passage and employment if it can identify and exclude from admission
those applicants that will be a problem after graduation. In its attempt to
maximize its USN&WR rank, a law school might look unfavorably on
applicants who belong to groups that have done poorly on the bar exam in
the past. Similarly, law schools maximizing rank might look less favorably
on first-generation law applicants than on students who have employment
connections and safety nets in the law and business world.
This incentive to eliminate minority students and students who are the
first in their families to apply to law school may continue even after
admission. Both the bar pass ratio and the employment ratio are calculated
with reference to the number of students graduating from a school, not the
number of students that started three years earlier. For that reason, if it
appears that students will not get a job, it is in the interest of the school to
eliminate them from the class by flunking them out before they graduate. I
am not aware of this happening, but it is a source of pressure worth
avoiding and it could be avoided if USN& WR would quit using those two
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ratios in its ranking. The bar pass ratio, even when compared to the bar
pass ratio in the state, is a poor indicator of law school quality in any
case, 16 and creates nasty incentives to teach to the test rather than teaching
what students need to know to be good lawyers and responsible and
influential citizens. USN&WR should drop it from the formula even if it
does not have any undesirable effect on minority participation in law
schools.
Some of those concerned about diversity have argued that USN&WR
should include a diversity factor in its ranking formula. This is a bad idea.
Even assuming such a number (or range) could be agreed upon, its
inclusion would be the downfall of diversity and freedom of admissions.
The power of the USN&WR ranking would indeed draw schools toward
whatever new goal was established. But, that migration would bring with it
two negative consequences. First, schools themselves would gravitate
toward a common level of diversity and away from diversity regarding
diversity. While diversity within each school matters, diversity across
schools matters as well. Whatever USN&WR chooses as the goal will pull
schools toward uniformity and away from diversity on that criterion. 17
Inclusion of a new diversity factor will not change the net effect, which is
that the ABA defines a product and mandates that competition be narrowed
to that product rather than allowing law schools to compete by offering
different products.18 Moreover, because there would be less diversity
across law schools, it would look to outsiders like they are employing a
racial quota.
Second, schools would have even less of the essential freedom of
admission than the little they have today. That, itself, is reason enough to
not to include diversity as a factor in the rankings. But that is not all. If law
schools reduce their own freedom by pressuring USN& WR to adopt
16 USN&WR's mathematical manipulation of the bar passage numbers is especially problematic.
USN&WR divides the bar passage rate of the school in one or more states by the bar passage rate of
those states. This adjusts for the fact that some states have easier bar exams than others, but creates a
different problem. The formula gives a big advantage to schools serving states also served by a lot of
schools with low rates of bar passage. If the bar passage rate is 50% in some state, a school serving that
state could have a bar passage ratio of 2/1. If the bar passage rate is 80% in another state, a school
serving that state can achieve a bar passage ratio of 5/4 at best. The result is that some schools in
California, for example, get a leg up in the annual rankings.
17 Stake, supra note 4, at 242. USN&WR pushes schools to adopt the same balance of expenditures,
whatever combination it is that will maximize the USN&WR score. Over time, this will tend to
homogenize law schools.
18 1 am not making an argument against ABA accreditation or the application of standards in the
process of accreditation. I am arguing that the ABA should consider whether the data it demands in the
accreditation process will be picked up by USN&WR and, if so, do its best to ensure that the data
demanded does not unduly restrict the scope of competition between law schools.
2013]
232 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS &ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:1
diversity as a criterion, they will inadvertently trumpet the message that the
faculty's freedom to choose its students matters little to them. Seeing that
law schools do not value what was once called an "essential freedom," and
seeing that the impact of law school admissions is the same impact as
would result from employing a quota, the Supreme Court might be moved
to outlaw any consideration of race in admissions. Were that to happen,
those favoring diversity would have traded a permanent loss to all law
schools for a temporary gain at some law schools.
Another proposal occasionally in circulation is that the ABA discontinue
its mandate that law schools require their applicants to take the LSAT. This
idea is worse than bad. The LSAT is the best available single numerical
predictor of performance in the first year of law school. If one of the two
current numbers is to be discontinued, it ought to be the UGPA. 19 As noted
above, the median correlation between the FYA and the LSAT is .36,
which is higher than the .28 median correlation between the FYA and the
UGPA. 20 But the difference between those correlation coefficients does
not come close to telling the whole story of the loss that admissions will
suffer if the LSAT is not required. First-year grades are even better
predicted by an index made up of a weighted combination of the LSAT and
UGPA. The LSAC calculates just such an index (hereinafter "Index") with
a formula optimized separately for each law school choosing to avail itself
of that service. The median correlation between FYA and these Indexes is
.47, obviously far better than the .28 for UGPA alone. 21
If the LSAT is no longer required and UGPA continues to be required,
USN&WR will likely shift weight to the UGPA, and schools will step up
their competition for students with high grades. One of the ways schools
can compete is to be willing to admit students who have not taken the
LSAT, which surely is contemplated by the proposal to discontinue the
LSAT requirement, thus starting a race to the bottom at which point the
LSAT will not be taken by students whose UGPA is higher than their
expected performance on the LSAT. When that happens, not only will
schools have lost the ability to compare applicants on the LSAT, they will
19 If law schools focus solely on the LSAT, doing so will create fewer bad incentives for students
in college than if law schools focus solely on the UGPA. (Current pressures have caused university
personnel to advise undergraduate students hoping to go to law school to avoid courses that will reduce
their UGPA.)
20 Stilwell, Dalessandro & Reese, supra note 6.
21 Id. The LSAC offers each school a number of choices on how to construct the Index, essentially
letting the school choose how much weight to put on the LSAT and UGPA. The LSAC does not make it
clear in its report whether the median correlation coefficient is based on the optimal index for each
school, or the Index chosen by each school. Id.
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have lost the ability to compare applicants on the Index.
And the story might worsen from there. As explained above, the UGPA
may appear more predictive than it is because admissions offices have
filtered out some students whose high UGPA's are based on easy courses.
If the UGPA becomes more important, schools will more frequently ignore
the easy courses and the UGPA may become less predictive. If it eliminates
the LSAT requirement, the ABA will shift law schools from a system under
which admissions offices can compare students on the Index, which has a
median correlation coefficient of .46, to a system under which schools can
compare students only on the UGPA, which could have a median
correlation coefficient of something below .28. This is not a recipe for
producing competent lawyers.
If adding a diversity factor would reduce freedom of admissions and
eliminating the LSAT would diminish the quality of law graduates, what
can be done to enhance the representation of minorities in law schools?
One conceivable course of action is to exclude minorities when calculating
LSAT and UGPA medians. But that would serve only the narrowest form
of diversity, doing nothing to reclaim the broader freedom to admit
majority students for reasons other than their numbers. Another approach
would be for schools to ignore the ABA-USN& WR mandate and do what is
right for the students and the nation. Indeed, this is what a member of the
ABA questionnaire committee told me to do when I tried to explain why
the data collected by the ABA put pressure on schools to deny admission to
minorities. 22 Of course, that might be the right thing to do, but it is not
going to happen at most schools. Law schools are in a prisoner's dilemma.
Regardless of what other schools do, each school can enhance its rank by
obeying the ABA-USN&WR mandate to admit applicants with high marks
on past exams and ignore the social benefits of taking students that are
predicted to be honest and competent lawyers. Not only will they reduce
their own well-being by taking the high road, schools that do so will reduce
their prestige and influence in the future by sacrificing their ranks. Thus, by
acting in the public interest in the present they will reduce their power to
act in the public interest in the future. 23
22 In addition to telling me to do what is right for the nation and to ignore what is good for my
school, the ABA questionnaire committee member repeatedly asserted that it would make no difference
to minority admissions if the ABA were to collect, and USN&WR were to use, the first quartiles and
third quartiles rather than medians. To this day, I remain puzzled by that contention.
23 Another way to view the situation is as a tragedy of the commons, see Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), available at
http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art-tragedyof the commons.html. Schools that do what is
best for society will operate at a disadvantage compared to those that behave selfishly. Those behaving
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A far more promising course of action would be for law schools to urge
the ABA to stop collecting separate LSAT and UGPA statistics and start
collecting the median on a Universal Index ("UI") composed of both the
LSAT and UGPA of each student. The UI would be calculated by
multiplying a student's UGPA by ten and adding that to the LSAT.24 If the
ABA would collect the median UI from each school, and USN& WR were
to follow suit by replacing the separate LSAT and UGPA with the UI,25
schools would naturally attempt to maximize that median. That shift from
maximizing two separate medians to maximizing one median would
dramatically expand the freedom schools have to admit the students they
want to admit. Even if one half of the class were taken entirely by reference
to the Ul, the other half could be admitted by reference to all of the factors
in the file, weighted however the school wished to weight those factors.
Every school would have more freedom to admit students by whatever
criteria the school considered to be most important to it, and it could use
that freedom however it wished to exercise it.
No sacrifice in student quality as measured purely by numbers would
result from implementing this change. Consider the seats in a school's
entering class that are going to be allocated wholly by reference to the
LSAT and UGPA. The best a school can do is to allocate those seats
according to the Index, which combines the LSAT and UGPA for each
student. As noted above, the median correlation between FYA and the
UGPA is .28, between FYA and the LSAT is .36, and between FYA and
the Index is .46. 26 The Index improves on the LSAT more than the LSAT
improves on the UGPA. Admittedly, the U would be less predictive than
the Index for some schools because the latter is optimized for each school
rather than being generalized to a UGPA/LSAT ratio of 10 to 1.27 But that
altruistically will, in the exercise of that altruism, gradually give away their power to do good.
24 It is not possible to use the existing Index for this purpose because the formula for the Index is
different for each school. In other words, although there is an Index for each applicant at each school,
there is no single Index for each applicant at all schools. Only a newly-created Universal Index could
serve for comparing schools. In addition, this calculation is beyond the power of USN&WR to do on its
own because it does not have the individual data needed to calculate the UI for each student. USN&WR
could ask schools to calculate and report this median, but it is doubtful that schools would comply.
However, if USN& WR would request the median UI and all schools would report it, action by the ABA
would not be needed.
25 At the Opening Doors symposium, Robert Morse expressed willingness to consider this
possibility. This makes sense, as the UI would better serve USN&WR's interest in assessing the quality
of law schools since the UI is a better measure of student quality than the separate measures of LSAT
and UGPA. Moreover, any unexpected reluctance on the part of USN&WR could be overcome if the
ABA were to discontinue collecting the LSAT and UGPA medians and thus deprive USN&WR of
reliable data on those factors.
26 Stilwell, Dalessandro & Reese, supra note 6.
27 Multiplying the UGPA by 15 gives it about 50% of the weight. Multiplying the UGPA by 8
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does not mean that the new system would lead to admitting less qualified
students than are now being admitted. At some schools, the UI would be
only slightly less predictive of FYA.28 In addition, many of the students
having an admissible Index would have an admissible UI. And, most
important, students with admissible Indexes but insufficient UI's could be
admitted in the half of the class not dedicated to the UT. The shift from two
measures to one would give the school complete control of half of the class
and complete freedom to admit applicants with below-median UI's into
that half. Not only would admission by numbers not get worse, in fact,
perhaps surprisingly, numerically predicted performance could improve.
The current system considers LSAT and UGPA separately, while a system
based on the UI would push schools to consider a combination of the LSAT
and UGPA. Shifting the focus of admissions to the UI will increase the
quality of students admitted primarily according to their numbers.
Calculating the U would not be burdensome. Admissions offices would
simply add one column to their admissions spreadsheets and add one cell
that calculates the median of that new column. Indeed, it would probably
be easy for the ABA together with the Association of American Law
Schools to convince the LSAC to do the calculation of each applicant's Ul
and report it as a part of each file, along with the Index that it currently
reports to some law schools, obviating the need for the admissions offices
to do even that simple calculation.2 9
If, for whatever reason, this UI proposal is unworkable, those who favor
diversity and freedom of admissions should try to convince the ABA to
stop collecting any statistics relating to the UGPA of students entering law
schools. That would leave the LSAT as the primary numerical admissions
goal. The LSAT, unlike the UGPA, will remain a reasonably robust
predictor of first-year law-school performance in the future, although
probably not as predictive as the UT. Focusing the eyes of law school
admissions personnel on the LSAT does not distort student choices of
undergraduate schools or curricula, and on this point is superior to the UI.
gives it about 25% of the weight. Multiplying the UGPA by 10 would be easy and probably quite
predictive (see the next footnote) but the ultimate choice would, of course, be somewhat arbitrary.
Perhaps the best choice for the UGPA multiplier would be the median ratio of the coefficients used by
LSAC in its calculation of the Indexes for participating schools.
28 At Maurer, the maximum correlation of FYA with the Index is .515. But the curve is fairly flat
on top and the correlation stays above .50 as long as the LSAT is accorded anywhere from 50% to 75%
of the weight in the formula (and the UGPA has the other 50% to 25% of the weight) LSAC Report to
Indiana Univ. Maurer School of Law (on file with Indiana University Maurer School of Law).
29 1 proposed to the LSAC that it initiate this change, but that came to naught. Perhaps the LSAC
does not want to be perceived as interfering with law school admissions. The schools will probably
have to make a formal request before the LSAC will act.
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And, as explained above, eliminating the UGPA and shifting attention to
the LSAT alone, like the UI alone, would restore to law schools most of
their freedom to admit the students they would like to admit on the criteria
they consider most important. That change would, in every way, be an
improvement over the status quo. The simplest way to enhance freedom of
admissions would be for the ABA to stop requiring schools to report
UGPA statistics.
If the ABA is going to require law schools to report numbers regarding
matriculants every year, the ABA should choose a single number (the UI)
that has more value in predicting performance rather than a pair of numbers
that, because they are not combined for each student, have less predictive
value. If the ABA is going to require law schools to report numbers that
could influence student choices of undergraduate coursework, the ABA
should choose a number (the LSAT or, somewhat worse, the UI) that has
less influence rather than a number (the UGPA) that distorts those choices.
If the ABA is going to require law schools to report numbers that create
incentives to grant some applicants admission and deny others, the ABA
should choose one number (either the UI or the LSAT) that puts little
pressure on schools to deny African American and Mexican American
applicants rather than two numbers that together exert great adverse
pressure. If the ABA is going to require law schools to report numbers that
constrain law schools in their choices of whom to teach, the ABA should
choose a number (either the UI or the LSAT) that respects academic
freedom rather than a combination of numbers that usurps it. But the ABA
shows little interest in reducing its interference with law school admissions.
Law schools will regain this essential freedom only if they take affirmative
steps to reclaim it.
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